

**AUDIT COMMITTEE – 21st July 2021**

**Report of the Head of Finance and Property Services**

**Lead Member: Councillor Tom Barkley**

**Part A**

ITEM 14

**TREASURY OUTTURN REPORT 2020/21**

**Purpose of Report**

To report to the Committee the Council's Treasury Management, Investment Management and Prudential Code Outturns for the year 2020/21.

**Action Requested**

That the contents of the report be noted.

**Policy Justification**

That we will deliver value for money for the people of Charnwood Borough Council.

**Implementation Timetable including Future Decisions**

The outturn report is submitted annually and presented to the Audit Committee for noting.

**Report Implications**

The following implications have been identified for this report:

*Financial Implications*

None.

*Risk Management*

There are no risks associated with this decision.

Background Papers:           None

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## Part B

### 1.Purpose

The Council is required by regulations issued under the Local Government Act 2003 to produce an annual treasury management review of activities and the actual prudential and treasury indicators for 2020/21. This report meets the requirements of both the CIPFA Code of Practice on Treasury Management (the Code) and the CIPFA Prudential Code for Capital Finance in Local Authorities (the Prudential Code).

During 2020/21 the minimum reporting requirements were that the full Council should receive the following reports:

- an annual treasury strategy in advance of the year (Council 24/02/2020), followed by a revised updated treasury strategy (Cabinet 15<sup>th</sup> October 2020, and Council 9<sup>th</sup> November 2020.)
- a mid-year treasury update report (Audit Committee 22/12/2020)(Cabinet 14<sup>th</sup> January 2021)(Council 22/02/2021)
- an annual review following the end of the year describing the activity compared to the strategy (this report)

The regulatory environment places responsibility on members for the review and scrutiny of treasury management policy and activities. This report is therefore important in that respect, as it provides details of the outturn position for treasury activities and highlights compliance with the Council's policies previously approved by members.

This Council confirms that it has complied with the requirement under the Code to give prior scrutiny to all of the above treasury management reports by the Audit Committee before they were reported to the full Council. Member training on treasury management issues is undertaken when required or requested in order to support the members' scrutiny role.

## Introduction and Background

This report summarises the following:-

- Capital activity during the year;
- Impact of this activity on the Council's underlying indebtedness, (the Capital Financing Requirement);
- The actual prudential and treasury indicators;
- Overall treasury position identifying how the Council has borrowed in relation to this indebtedness, and the impact on investment balances;
- Summary of interest rate movements in the year;
- Detailed debt activity and investment activity.

## 2.The Council's Capital Expenditure and Financing

The Council undertakes capital expenditure on long-term assets. These activities may either be:

- Financed immediately through the application of capital or revenue resources (capital receipts, capital grants, revenue contributions, internal borrowing etc.), which has no resultant impact on the Council's borrowing need; or
- If insufficient financing is available, or a decision is taken not to apply resources, the capital expenditure will give rise to a borrowing need.

The actual capital expenditure forms one of the required prudential indicators. The table below shows the actual capital expenditure for 2020/21, this was financed in the year by Capital reserves, internal borrowing, external funding and Capital receipts, there was no borrowing required.

£m General Fund	2019/20 Actual	2020/21 Revised Budget	2020/21 Current Budget	2020/21 Actual
<b>Capital expenditure</b>				
Financed in year	2,236	41,789	42,828	29,906
Unfinanced Regeneration Investment	0	15,000	15,000	0
Total	2,236	56,789	57,828	29,906

£m HRA	2019/20 Actual	2020/21 Revised Budget	2020/21 Current Budget	2020/21 Actual
<b>Capital expenditure</b>				
Financed in year	8,203	8,941	9,100	4,026

## 3.The Council's Overall Borrowing Need (Capital Financing Requirement)

The Council's underlying need to borrow for capital expenditure is termed the Capital Financing Requirement (CFR). This figure is a gauge of the Council's indebtedness. The CFR results from the capital activity of the Council and resources used to pay for the capital spend. It represents the 2020/21 unfinanced capital expenditure (see above table), and

prior years' net or unfinanced capital expenditure which has not yet been paid for by revenue or other resources.

Part of the Council's treasury activities is to address the funding requirements for this borrowing need. Depending on the capital expenditure programme, the treasury service organises the Council's cash position to ensure that sufficient cash is available to meet the capital plans and cash flow requirements. This may be sourced through borrowing from external bodies, (such as the Government, through the Public Works Loan Board [PWLB], or the money markets), or utilising temporary cash resources within the Council.

**Reducing the CFR** – the Council's underlying borrowing need (CFR) is not allowed to rise indefinitely. Statutory controls are in place to ensure that capital assets are broadly charged to revenue over the life of the asset. The Council is required to make an annual revenue charge, called the Minimum Revenue Provision – MRP, to reduce the CFR. This is effectively a repayment of the non-Housing Revenue Account (HRA) borrowing need, (there is no statutory requirement to reduce the HRA CFR). This differs from the treasury management arrangements which ensure that cash is available to meet capital commitments. External debt can also be borrowed or repaid at any time, but this does not change the CFR. The Council does not currently have a MRP charge in 2020/21 as the Council's MRP Policy states that a full years MRP charge will be made in the year after the purchase of an Asset, therefore the first year of MRP charges will be 2021/22.

The total CFR can also be reduced by:

- the application of additional capital financing resources, (such as unapplied capital receipts); or
- charging more than the statutory revenue charge (MRP) each year through a Voluntary Revenue Provision (VRP).

The Council's CFR for the year is shown below, and represents a key prudential indicator. Borrowing activity is constrained by prudential indicators for gross borrowing and the CFR, and by the authorised limit.

**Gross borrowing and the CFR** – CFR is the overall borrowing requirement for Capital Expenditure. In order to ensure that borrowing levels are prudent over the medium term and only for a capital purpose, the Council should ensure that its gross external borrowing does not, except in the short term, exceed the total of the capital financing requirement in the preceding year (2020/21) plus the estimates of any additional capital financing requirement for the current (2021/22) and next two financial years. This essentially means that the Council is not borrowing to support revenue expenditure. This indicator allowed the Council some flexibility to borrow in advance of its immediate capital needs in 2020/21. The table below highlights the Council’s gross borrowing position against the CFR. The Council has complied with this prudential indicator.

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	31 March 2019 Actual	31 March 2021 Revised Budget	31 March 2021 Actual
Gross External borrowing General Fund	£2,000m	£49,400m	£2,000m
Gross Internal Borrowing	0	0	£25,385m
Gross External borrowing HRA	£79,190m	£79,190m	£79,190m
Total Gross Borrowing	£81,190m	£128,590m	£106,575m
CFR	£81,820m	£129,220m	£107,205m
Under / (over) borrowed of CFR	£630k	£630k	£630k

**The Authorised limit - £143.4m** the authorised limit is the “affordable borrowing limit” required by s3 of the Local Government Act 2003. Once this has been set, the Council does not have the power to borrow above this level. The table below demonstrates that during 2020/21 the Council has maintained gross borrowing within its authorised limit.

**The Operational boundary- £128.5m** the operational boundary is the expected borrowing position of the Council during the year. Periods where the actual position is either below or over the boundary are acceptable subject to the authorised limit not being breached.

**Actual financing costs as a proportion of net revenue stream** - this indicator identifies the trend in the cost of capital, (borrowing and other long term obligation costs net of investment income), against the net revenue stream.

	2020/21
Authorised limit	£143.4m
Maximum gross borrowing position during the year	£81,190m
Operational boundary	£128.5m
Financing costs as a proportion of net revenue stream - General Fund	-0.57%
Financing costs as a proportion of net revenue stream - HRA	12.17%

### 3. Overall Treasury Position as at 31 March 2021

The Council's treasury management debt and investment position is organised by the treasury management service in order to ensure adequate liquidity for revenue and capital activities, security for investments and to manage risks within all treasury management activities. Procedures and controls to achieve these objectives are well established both through member reporting detailed in the summary, and through officer activity detailed in the Council's Treasury Management Practices. At the end of 2020/21 the Council's treasury position was as follows:-

#### Treasury Management Position

	31 st March 2020 Principal £'000	Rate of Return %	Average Life Years	31 st March 2021 Principal £'000	Rate of Return %	Average Life Years
<b>Debt</b>						
General Fund	2,000	11.63%	4	2,000	11.63%	3
HRA	79,190	3.41%	20	79,190	3.41%	19
<b>Gross Debt</b>	<b>81,190</b>			<b>81,190</b>		
<b>Less CFR</b>	<b>(81,820)</b>			<b>(81,820)</b>		
<b>Over/(Under borrowed)</b>	<b>(630)</b>			<b>(630)</b>		
Less Total Investments held	56,030			35,705		
<b>Total Net Debt</b>	<b>(25,160)</b>			<b>(46,745)</b>		

### 4. The Economy and Interest Rates

**UK. Coronavirus.** The financial year 2020/21 will go down in history as being the year of the pandemic. The first national lockdown in late March 2020 did huge damage to an economy that was unprepared for such an eventuality. This caused an economic downturn that exceeded the one caused by the financial crisis of 2008/09. A short second lockdown in November did relatively little damage but by the time of the third lockdown in January 2021, businesses and individuals had become more resilient in adapting to working in new ways during a three month lockdown so much less damage than was caused than in the first one. The advent of vaccines starting in November 2020, were a game changer. The way in which the UK and US have led the world in implementing a fast programme of vaccination which promises to lead to a return to something approaching normal life during the second half of 2021, has been instrumental in speeding economic recovery and the reopening of the economy. In addition, the household saving rate has been exceptionally high since the first lockdown in March 2020 and so there is plenty of pent-up demand and purchasing power stored up for services in the still-depressed sectors like restaurants, travel and hotels as soon as they reopen. It is therefore expected that the UK economy could recover its pre-pandemic level of economic activity du Both the Government and the Bank of England took rapid action in March 2020 at the height of the crisis to provide support to financial markets to ensure their proper functioning, and to support the economy and to protect jobs.

The **Monetary Policy Committee** cut Bank Rate from 0.75% to 0.25% and then to 0.10% in March 2020 and embarked on a £200bn programme of quantitative easing QE (purchase of gilts so as to reduce borrowing costs throughout the economy by lowering gilt yields). The MPC increased then QE by £100bn in June and by £150bn in November to a total of £895bn. While Bank Rate remained unchanged for the rest of the year, financial markets were concerned that the MPC could cut Bank Rate to a negative rate; this was firmly discounted at the February 2021 MPC meeting when it was established that commercial banks would be unable to implement negative rates for at least six months – by which time the economy was expected to be making a strong recovery and negative rates would no longer be needed.

**Average inflation targeting.** This was the major change adopted by the Bank of England in terms of implementing its inflation target of 2%. The key addition to the Bank's forward guidance in August was a new phrase in the policy statement, namely that "it does not intend to tighten monetary policy until there is clear evidence that significant progress is being made in eliminating spare capacity and **achieving the 2% target sustainably**". That seems designed to say, in effect, that even if inflation rises to 2% in a couple of years' time, do not expect any action from the MPC to raise Bank Rate – until they can clearly see that level of inflation is going to be persistently above target if it takes no action to raise Bank Rate. This sets a high bar for raising Bank Rate and no increase is expected by March 2024, and possibly for as long as five years. Inflation has been well under 2% during 2020/21; it is expected to briefly peak at just over 2% towards the end of 2021, but this is a temporary short lived factor and so not a concern to the MPC.

**Government support.** The Chancellor has implemented repeated rounds of support to businesses by way of cheap loans and other measures, and has protected jobs by paying for workers to be placed on furlough. This support has come at a huge cost in terms of the Government's budget deficit ballooning in 20/21 and 21/22 so that the Debt to GDP ratio reaches around 100%. The Budget on 3rd March 2021 increased fiscal support to the economy and employment during 2021 and 2022 followed by substantial tax rises in the following three years to help to pay the cost for the pandemic. This will help further to strengthen the economic recovery from the pandemic and to return the government's finances to a balanced budget on a current expenditure and income basis in 2025/26. This will stop the Debt to GDP ratio rising further from 100%. An area of concern, though, is that the government's debt is now twice as sensitive to interest rate rises as before the pandemic due to QE operations substituting fixed long-term debt for floating rate debt; there is, therefore, much incentive for the Government to promote Bank Rate staying low e.g. by using fiscal policy in conjunction with the monetary policy action by the Bank of England to keep inflation from rising too high, and / or by amending the Bank's policy mandate to allow for a higher target for inflation.

**BREXIT.** The final agreement on 24<sup>th</sup> December 2020 eliminated a significant downside risk for the UK economy. The initial agreement only covered trade so there is further work to be done on the services sector where temporary equivalence has been granted in both directions between the UK and EU; that now needs to be formalised on a permanent basis. There was much disruption to trade in January as form filling has proved to be a formidable barrier to trade. This appears to have eased somewhat since then but is an area that needs further work to ease difficulties, which are still acute in some areas.

**USA.** The US economy did not suffer as much damage as the UK economy due to the pandemic. The Democrats won the presidential election in November 2020 and have control of both Congress and the Senate, although power is more limited in the latter. This enabled the Democrats to pass a \$1.9trn (8.8% of GDP) stimulus package in March on top of the \$900bn fiscal stimulus deal passed by Congress in late December. These, together with the vaccine rollout proceeding swiftly to hit the target of giving a first jab to over half of the population within the President's first 100 days, will promote a rapid easing of

restrictions and strong economic recovery during 2021. The Democrats are also planning to pass a \$2trn fiscal stimulus package aimed at renewing infrastructure over the next decade. Although this package is longer-term, if passed, it would also help economic recovery in the near-term.

After Chair Jerome Powell spoke on the **Fed's adoption of a flexible average inflation target** in his Jackson Hole speech in late August 2020, the mid-September meeting of the Fed agreed a new inflation target - that *"it would likely be appropriate to maintain the current target range until labour market conditions were judged to be consistent with the Committee's assessments of maximum employment and inflation had risen to 2% and was on track to moderately exceed 2% for some time."* This change was aimed to provide more stimulus for economic growth and higher levels of employment and to avoid the danger of getting caught in a deflationary "trap" like Japan. It is to be noted that inflation has actually been under-shooting the 2% target significantly for most of the last decade, (and this year), so financial markets took note that higher levels of inflation are likely to be in the pipeline; long-term bond yields duly rose after the meeting. There is now some expectation that where the Fed has led in changing its policy towards implementing its inflation and full employment mandate, other major central banks will follow, as indeed the Bank of England has done so already. The Fed expects strong economic growth during 2021 to have only a transitory impact on inflation, which explains why the majority of Fed officials project US interest rates to remain near-zero through to the end of 2023. The key message is still that policy will remain unusually accommodative – with near-zero rates and asset purchases – continuing for several more years. This is likely to result in keeping treasury yields at historically low levels. However, financial markets in 2021 have been concerned that the sheer amount of fiscal stimulus, on top of highly accommodative monetary policy, could be over-kill leading to a rapid elimination of spare capacity in the economy and generating higher inflation much quicker than the Fed expects. They have also been concerned as to how and when the Fed will eventually wind down its programme of monthly QE purchases of treasuries. These concerns have pushed treasury yields sharply up in the US in 2021 and is likely to have also exerted some upward pressure on gilt yields in the UK.

**EU.** Both the roll out and take up of vaccines has been disappointingly slow in the EU in 2021, at a time when many countries are experiencing a sharp rise in cases which are threatening to overwhelm hospitals in some major countries; this has led to renewed severe restrictions or lockdowns during March. This will inevitably put back economic recovery after the economy had staged a rapid rebound from the first lockdowns in Q3 of 2020 but contracted slightly in Q4 to end 2020 only 4.9% below its pre-pandemic level. Recovery will now be delayed until Q3 of 2021 and a return to pre-pandemic levels is expected in the second half of 2022.

Inflation was well under 2% during 2020/21. **The ECB** did not cut its main rate of -0.5% further into negative territory during 2020/21. It embarked on a major expansion of its QE operations (PEPP) in March 2020 and added further to that in its December 2020 meeting when it also greatly expanded its programme of providing cheap loans to banks. The total PEPP scheme of €1,850bn is providing protection to the sovereign bond yields of weaker countries like Italy. There is, therefore, **unlikely to be a euro crisis** while the ECB is able to maintain this level of support.

**China.** After a concerted effort to get on top of the virus outbreak in Q1 of 2020, economic recovery was strong in the rest of the year; this has enabled China to recover all of the contraction in Q1. Policy makers have both quashed the virus and implemented a programme of monetary and fiscal support that has been particularly effective at stimulating short-term growth.

**Japan.** Three rounds of government fiscal support in 2020 together with Japan's relative success in containing the virus without draconian measures so far, and the roll out of vaccines gathering momentum in 2021, should help to ensure a strong recovery in 2021 and to get back to pre-virus levels by Q3.

**World growth.** World growth was in recession in 2020. Inflation is unlikely to be a problem in most countries for some years due to the creation of excess production capacity and depressed demand caused by the coronavirus crisis.

**Deglobalisation.** Until recent years, world growth has been boosted by increasing globalisation i.e. countries specialising in producing goods and commodities in which they have an economic advantage and which they then trade with the rest of the world. This has boosted worldwide productivity and growth, and, by lowering costs, has also depressed inflation. However, the rise of China as an economic superpower over the last 30 years, which now accounts for nearly 20% of total world GDP, has unbalanced the world economy. In March 2021, western democracies implemented limited sanctions against a few officials in charge of government policy on the Uighurs in Xinjiang; this led to a much bigger retaliation by China and is likely to mean that the China / EU investment deal then being negotiated, will be torn up. After the pandemic exposed how frail extended supply lines were around the world, both factors are now likely to lead to a sharp retrenchment of economies into two blocs of western democracies v. autocracies. It is, therefore, likely that we are heading into a period where there will be a reversal of world globalisation and a decoupling of western countries from dependence on China to supply products and vice versa. This is likely to reduce world growth rates.

**Central banks' monetary policy.** During the pandemic, the governments of western countries have provided massive fiscal support to their economies which has resulted in a big increase in total government debt in each country. It is therefore very important that bond yields stay low while debt to GDP ratios slowly subside under the impact of economic growth. This provides governments with a good reason to amend the mandates given to central banks to allow higher average levels of inflation than we have generally seen over the last couple of decades. Both the Fed and Bank of England have already changed their policy towards implementing their existing mandates on inflation, (and full employment), to hitting an average level of inflation. Greater emphasis could also be placed on hitting subsidiary targets e.g. full employment before raising rates. Higher average rates of inflation would also help to erode the real value of government debt more quickly.

#### **4.1 Investment strategy and control of interest rate risk**


Investment returns which had been low during 2019/20, plunged during 2020/21 to near zero or even into negative territory. Most local authority lending managed to avoid negative rates and one feature of the year was the growth of inter local authority lending. The expectation for interest rates within the treasury management strategy for 2020/21 was that Bank Rate would continue at the start of the year at 0.75 % before rising to end 2022/23 at 1.25%. This forecast was invalidated by the Covid-19 pandemic bursting onto the scene in March 2020 which caused the Monetary Policy Committee to cut Bank Rate in March, first to 0.25% and then to 0.10%, in order to counter the hugely negative impact of the national lockdown on large swathes of the economy. The Bank of England and the Government also introduced new programmes of supplying the banking system and the economy with massive amounts of cheap credit so that banks could help cash-starved businesses to survive the lockdown. The Government also supplied huge amounts of finance to local authorities to pass on to businesses. This meant that for most of the year there was much more liquidity in financial markets than there was demand to borrow, with the consequent effect that investment earnings rates plummeted.

While the Council has taken a cautious approach to investing, it is also fully appreciative of changes to regulatory requirements for financial institutions in terms of additional capital and liquidity that came about in the aftermath of the financial crisis. These requirements have provided a far stronger basis for financial institutions, with annual stress tests by

regulators evidencing how institutions are now far more able to cope with extreme stressed market and economic conditions.

Investment balances have been kept to a minimum through the agreed strategy of using reserves and balances to support internal borrowing, rather than borrowing externally from the financial markets. External borrowing would have incurred an additional cost, due to the differential between borrowing and investment rates as illustrated in the charts shown above and below. Such an approach has also provided benefits in terms of reducing the counterparty risk exposure, by having fewer investments placed in the financial markets.

## Investment strategy and control of interest rate risk



	Bank Rate	7 day	1 mth	3 mth	6 mth	12 mth
<b>High</b>	0.10	0.00	0.14	0.56	0.62	0.77
<b>High Date</b>	01/04/2020	02/04/2020	20/04/2020	08/04/2020	14/04/2020	21/04/2020
<b>Low</b>	0.10	-0.10	-0.11	-0.10	-0.10	-0.05
<b>Low Date</b>	01/04/2020	31/12/2020	29/12/2020	23/12/2020	21/12/2020	11/01/2021
<b>Average</b>	0.10	-0.07	-0.05	0.01	0.07	0.17
<b>Spread</b>	0.00	0.10	0.25	0.66	0.73	0.83

## 4.2 Borrowing strategy and control of interest rate risk

During 2020/21, the Council maintained an under-borrowed position. This meant that the capital borrowing need, (the Capital Financing Requirement), was not fully funded with loan debt, as cash supporting the Council's reserves, balances and cash flow was used as an


interim measure. This strategy was prudent as investment returns were low and minimising counterparty risk on placing investments also needed to be considered.

A cost of carry remained during the year on any new long-term borrowing that was not immediately used to finance capital expenditure, as it would have caused a temporary increase in cash balances; this would have incurred a revenue cost – the difference between (higher) borrowing costs and (lower) investment returns.


The policy of avoiding new borrowing by running down spare cash balances, has served well over the last few years. However, this was kept under review to avoid incurring higher borrowing costs in the future when this authority may not be able to avoid new borrowing to finance capital expenditure and/or the refinancing of maturing debt.

Interest rate forecasts expected only gradual rises in medium and longer term fixed borrowing rates during 2020/21 and the two subsequent financial years. Variable, or short-term rates, were expected to be the cheaper form of borrowing over the period.

Link Group Interest Rate View		8.3.21											
	Mar-21	Jun-21	Sep-21	Dec-21	Mar-22	Jun-22	Sep-22	Dec-22	Mar-23	Jun-23	Sep-23	Dec-23	Mar-24
BANK RATE	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10
3 month ave earnings	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10
6 month ave earnings	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10
12 month ave earnings	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.20
5 yr PWLB	1.20	1.20	1.20	1.20	1.20	1.20	1.20	1.30	1.30	1.40	1.40	1.40	1.40
10 yr PWLB	1.60	1.60	1.60	1.60	1.70	1.70	1.70	1.80	1.80	1.90	1.90	1.90	1.90
25 yr PWLB	2.10	2.10	2.10	2.20	2.30	2.30	2.30	2.40	2.40	2.50	2.50	2.50	2.50
50 yr PWLB	1.90	1.90	1.90	2.00	2.10	2.10	2.10	2.20	2.20	2.30	2.30	2.30	2.30



	1 Year	5 Year	10 Year	25 Year	50 Year
<b>Low</b>	0.65%	0.72%	1.00%	1.53%	1.32%
<b>Date</b>	04/01/2021	11/12/2020	11/12/2020	11/12/2020	11/12/2020
<b>High</b>	1.94%	1.99%	2.28%	2.86%	2.71%
<b>Date</b>	08/04/2020	08/04/2020	11/11/2020	11/11/2020	11/11/2020
<b>Average</b>	1.43%	1.50%	1.81%	2.33%	2.14%
<b>Spread</b>	1.29%	1.27%	1.28%	1.33%	1.39%



PWLB rates are based on, and are determined by, gilt (UK Government bonds) yields through H.M.Treasury determining a specified margin to add to gilt yields. The main influences on gilt yields are Bank Rate, inflation expectations and movements in US treasury yields. Inflation targeting by the major central banks has been successful over the last 30 years in lowering inflation and the real equilibrium rate for central rates has fallen considerably due to the high level of borrowing by consumers: this means that central banks do not need to raise rates as much now to have a major impact on consumer spending, inflation, etc. This has pulled down the overall level of interest rates and bond yields in

financial markets over the last 30 years. We have seen over the last two years, many bond yields up to 10 years in the Eurozone turn negative on expectations that the EU would struggle to get growth rates and inflation up from low levels. In addition, there has, at times, been an inversion of bond yields in the US whereby 10 year yields have fallen below shorter term yields. In the past, this has been a precursor of a recession.

## 5. Borrowing Outturn

No additional external borrowing was undertaken in 2020/21 and no loans were repaid.

The total external borrowings at 31 March 2021 were £81.19m and no rescheduling was done during 2020/21 as the average 1% differential between PWLB new borrowing rates and premature repayment rates made rescheduling unviable. Similarly, there were no debt repayments during the year as the focus of the HRA strategy is to improve the housing stock rather than repay debt.

## 6. Investment Outturn

Investment Policy – the Council's investment policy is governed by MHCLG guidance, which has been implemented in the annual investment strategy approved by the Council on 25th February 2020. This policy sets out the approach for choosing investment counterparties, and is based on credit ratings provided by the three main credit rating agencies supplemented by additional market data (such as rating outlooks, credit default swaps, bank share prices etc.).

7. The investment activity during the year conformed to the approved strategy, and the Council had no liquidity difficulties.
8. Investments held by the Council at 31/3/2021 were £37.705m (£51.030m 2019/20) of internally managed funds. Security of capital remains the key consideration when placing investments. During the year the internally managed funds earned an average rate of return of 0.35% (0.929%) 2019/20 and the comparable performance indicator is the average 3 month LIBID rate, which was 0.0150% so this has outperformed this rate. The total interest earned was £342k (£562k 2019/20), compared to a revised budget of £300k for both Internal and external funds.
9. Externally Managed Property Funds investment income earned £182K, net return 3.14% (£181k, 2019/20, 3.26%). The investment returns are included in the table below. The Property funds have both performed higher than the internal managed funds average rate of return of 0.35% and the 12 month average LIBID rate 0.7086%.

The Property Fund fair value valuation 31/3/2021 Lothbury is £2.337m a reduction of £80k compared to acquisition cost £2.417m and Hermes fair value valuation 31/3/2021 is £2.327m compared to £2.500m reduction £173k, the property funds are held for a long investment period and therefore will be monitored and reviewed on a quarterly basis.

Property Fund	Date Acquired	Original Cost £000	Entry Fee £000	Total Original Cost £000	Interest Received 2020/21 £000	Gross Return 2020/21 %	Management Fee £000	Net Return 2020/21 %
Lothbury	01/03/2018	2,417	84	2,501	112	4.63	23.00	3.68
Hermes	26/07/2018	2,500	119	2,619	69	2.76	4.00	2.6
<b>Total</b>		<b>4,917</b>	<b>203</b>	<b>5,120</b>	<b>182</b>		<b>27.00</b>	<b>3.14</b>

**IFRS 9 fair value of investments** Following the consultation undertaken by the Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government, [MHCLG], on IFRS 9 the Government has introduced a mandatory statutory override for local authorities to reverse out all unrealised fair value movements resulting from pooled investment funds. This was effective from 1 April 2018. The statutory override applies for five years from this date. Local authorities are required to disclose the net impact of the unrealised fair value movements in a separate unusable reserve throughout the duration of the override in order for the Government to keep the override under review and to maintain a form of transparency.

#### 10. Portfolio of Investments held 31<sup>st</sup> March 2021

Investments held as at 31 March 2021	Maturity	£000
Slough Borough Council	01/04/2021	2,000
HSBC	1 Day Notice	4,790
HSBC	31 Day Notice	6,000
Santander	180 Day Notice	8,000
Goldman Sachs International Bank	35 day Notice	2,500
Goldman Sachs International Bank	95 day Notice	2,500
Federated Money Market Fund	1 Day Notice	4,915
<b>Total Managed Internally</b>		<b>30,705</b>
Lothbury Property Fund	n/a	2,500
Hermes Property Fund	n/a	2,500
<b>Total Managed Externally</b>		<b>5,000</b>
<b>TOTAL TREASURY INVESTMENTS</b>		<b>35,705</b>